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Review of Emmons et al.
“Philosophy may in no way interfere with
the actual use of language; it can in the end
only describe it . . . it leaves everything as it
is.” — L. Wittgenstein.
Am I writing this piece because I am con-
sciously willing or am I just the vehicle of
inevitable natural forces and laws that,
given my current context as well as biolog-
ical and social backgrounds, compel me
unconsciously to write down this essay? For
centuries, such questions have occupied theo-
logians, philosophers, and scientists alike. In
the early 1980s, the neurologist Benjamin
Libet performed landmark experiments
aimed at investigating the role of con-
sciousness in the generation of a motor
action (Libet et al., 1983). Libet et al.
(1983) measured the time when subjects
became consciously aware of the decision
to move. Using a clock with a rapidly ro-
tating dot, the subjects were asked to note
the position of the moving dot when he/
she was aware of the conscious decision to
move a finger (Fig. 1). Scalp EEG was used
simultaneously to monitor brain activity
during the experiment. Libet et al. (1983)
found a premovement buildup of electrical
potential called readiness potential (RP)
starting 550 ms before the movement.
Unexpectedly, the conscious awareness of
the decision or “the urge to move” emerged
only 200 ms before movement, leaving
therefore a time lag of 350 ms between
the initial rising of the RP and the con-
scious awareness of the decision to flex
(Fig. 1). Libet et al. (1983) interpreted the
early rise in the RP as a reflexion of neu-
ronal computation that unconsciously
prepare for the voluntary action. The con-
scious will emerging at 200 ms could
either allow or block the volitional process
to go to completion, resulting, respec-
tively, in the execution or withholding of
the motor act (Libet et al., 1983). There-
fore, according to Libet et al. (1983), our
brain unconsciously plans our behavior
but allows for a conscious “veto” to alter
the outcome of our volition. The findings
of Libet et al. (1983) have had an unri-
valled influence on the prevailing view
that both our conscious will and subse-
quent actions are caused by prior neural
activity. Recent studies, however, have fal-
sified the causal assumption behind the
RP and fine-tuned the notion and the pos-
sibility of a volitional “veto.”
Two questions directly linked to the
conclusions of Libet et al. (1983) are cen-
tral in understanding the relationship
between the RP and the conscious agency
of our actions. First, what kind of informa-
tion does RP neurally encode? And second,
is the RP causally linked with the behavioral
outcome? Within the context of the ex-
periment by Libet et al. (1983), the main
limitation in understanding the meaning
of RP is the concomitant modulation of
several factors during the execution of the
action. These include action preparation,
general anticipation of the occurrence of
an action, variable waiting time intervals
between the onset and the end of the ex-
periment, choice of whether and when to
move, and the impulsive urge to move
(Mele, 2017). All these factors could be
potentially reflected in the RP. In a recent
study published in The Journal of Neuro-
science, Emmons et al. (2017) conducted
elegant behavioral and electrophysiologi-
cal experiments to show that the potential
underlying neuronal correlates of the RP
encode the temporal component of action
control.
Although the RP described by Libet et
al. (1983) was recorded at the level of the
EEG, the results were replicated at the
single-neuron level in human MFC (Fried
et al. 2011). At the single-cell level, RP
reflects an average signal from two popu-
lations of neurons with increasing and de-
creasing patterns of neuronal firing (Fried
et al., 2011). Given the functional homol-
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ogy of the frontal cortex between humans
and rodents (Barthas and Kwan, 2017),
Emmons et al. (2017) recorded single-cell
activity from MFC of rats engaged in a
behavioral task involving computation of
interval timing (Emmons et al., 2017,
their Fig. 2). Rats were trained to press a
lever either 3 or 12 s after the onset of an
instructional cue in exchange for a re-
ward. Like the up and down ramping pat-
terns of neuronal activity described in
human MFC (Fried et al., 2011), Emmons
et al. (2017) found two populations of
neurons with, respectively, increasing and
decreasing neuronal firing rates across
time (Emmons et al., 2017, their Fig. 3).
Importantly, the authors showed that the
ramping of neuronal activity followed
similar patterns during trials with 3 and
12 s waiting intervals, but the ramping
scaled differently to represent elapsed
time (Emmons et al., 2017, their Figs. 3,
7). These results demonstrate that the pre-
movement ramping of neuronal activity
in the MFC encodes temporal processing
during the execution of a behavioral ac-
tion. To further confirm this conclusion,
Emmons et al. (2017) used a naive Bayes-
ian model to predict time from firing rates
of ramping neurons (Emmons et al., 2017,
their Fig. 8). Emmons et al. (2017) found
that the pattern of neuronal activity in the
MFC predicted time of waiting intervals
with a high degree of accuracy (Emmons
et al., 2017, their Fig. 8). These results ex-
plain why Fried et al. (2011) found that
the ramping rate in MFC was better able
to predict the timing of a voluntary deci-
sion to move relative to the decision to
move alone (98% vs 80%, respectively).
Together, these results provide evidence
that premovement ramping activity is a
key neuronal signal for processing tempo-
ral information within the MFC.
In line with other studies showing the
involvement of several cortical and sub-
cortical structures in tracking time inter-
vals (Bhattacharjee, 2006), Emmons et al.
(2017) found that neurons in the dorso-
medial striatum also encode waiting time
intervals through up and down ramping
activity (Emmons et al., 2017). What could be
the common underlying neuromodulatory
system behind the time-related modula-
tion of neuronal activity in these areas?
Both MFC and dorsomedial striatum are
densely innervated by midbrain dopami-
nergic neurons, and three recent studies
have directly implicated DA in the control
of judgment and estimation of time
(Soares et al., 2016; Howard et al., 2017;
Kim et al., 2017). Soares et al. (2016) mea-
sured and manipulated DA neurons in
mice trained, as in the Emmons et al.
(2017) study, to perform a behavioral task
in which they have to estimate the dura-
tion of time intervals. In addition to show-
ing that DA neurons encode information
about trial-to-trial variability in time esti-
mates, the authors found that pharmaco-
genetics and optogenetic manipulation of
DA neurons were sufficient to slow down
or speed up time estimation (Soares et al.,
2016). Conversely, depletion of DA in the
MFC has been shown to impair temporal
control of action (Kim et al., 2017). Inter-
estingly, optogenetic stimulation of pyra-
midal neurons expressing Type 1 DA
receptors compensates for interval timing
deficits by normalizing the ramping pat-
terns of neuronal activity in the MFC
(Kim et al., 2017). These results corrobo-
rate and extend the last experiment per-
formed by Emmons et al. (2017) showing
the critical role of MFC in encoding and
conveying temporal information to stria-
tal neurons (Emmons et al., 2017, their
Fig. 11). In the third study implicating do-
pamine in time estimation, Howard et al.
(2017) used an operant behavioral task in
which mice were trained to track time in-
tervals (2 or 8 s and 4 or 16 s) and found
that both activity of DA neurons and DA
concentration in the dorsal striatum dis-
played increasing and decreasing ramping
patterns that scaled with interval dura-
tion. In this study, however, DA signaling
did not simply reflect timing or even re-
ward prediction or value alone. Rather,
changes in the pattern of DA were associ-
ated with internal processes of choice
and action selection (Howard et al.,
2017). Collectively, all these studies point
to the ramping DA signal (Howe et al.,
2013) as a potential neuromodulatory sys-
tem underlying the encoding of interval
timing estimation and cognitive processes
of action selection by MFC.
What kind of action-related cognitive
processes are encoded in the ramping neu-
ronal activity of the MFC? This question
brings us back to the question of causality
between RP and the behavioral outcome.
Originally, Libet et al. (1983) interpreted the
RP as representing the brain decision “to
initiate or, at least, prepare to initiate the act
at a time before there is any reportable
Figure 1. Neuronal basis of RP. Because premovement building of the RP both at the EEG (a) (Libet et al., 1983) and single-unit
(b) (Fried et al., 2011) levels precedes the emergence of the intention to act, it was originally considered to reflect causal and
subconscious neuronal preparation of the action. Emmons et al. (2017) suggested that such ramping activity encodes time
intervals. Recent studies have revealed dopamine as a potential neuromodulatory system mediating the encoding of time
intervals as well as action-related cognitive processes through similar ramping patterns of activity (c) (Soares et al., 2016; Howard
et al., 2017; Kim et al., 2017).
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subjective awareness that such a decision
has taken place.” According to this model,
once the ramping activity in the frontal
cortex reaches a threshold, the motor
command is inevitably executed (Libet et
al., 1983; Fried et al., 2011). Using slightly
modified versions of Libet et al. (1983) ex-
periment, two recent studies have chal-
lenged this interpretation (Alexander et
al., 2016; Schultze-Kraft et al., 2016). The
first demonstrated that humans can still
cancel the initiation of a movement, even
after the onset of the RP up to a point of no
return 200 ms before movement onset.
Importantly however, it was found that,
even after the onset of the movement, it is
still possible to alter and abort the move-
ment as it unfolds (Schultze-Kraft et al.,
2016). Alexander et al. (2016) revealed
that robust RPs occur, even in the absence
of movement. Together, these two studies
demonstrate that premovement RP is not
sufficient for the enactment of a motor
action. Therefore, the RP must encode
processes other than motor-action prepa-
ration. Results from Emmons et al. (2017)
suggest that such ramping activity en-
codes self-monitored time intervals. This
hypothesis is particularly pertinent given
that self-monitoring of the passing of time
by the experimental subjects is intrinsic to
the Libet et al. (1983) experiment. Alterna-
tively, although not mutually exclusive, RP
might reflect general anticipation (i.e., the
conscious experience that an event will soon
occur) (Alexander et al., 2016) or simply
background neuronal noise (Schurger et al.,
2016). Future studies are needed to test
these alternatives.
Although the philosophical implica-
tions of these results are open for debate,
neural determinism defined as the media-
tion of all mental states by brain processes
is the inevitable paradigm, even if we as-
sume the centrality of conscious aware-
ness in action control. This view, however,
remains compatible with both physical-
ism (i.e., all mental states are caused by
brains) and interactionism (i.e., brain and
mind, while distinct and independent, ex-
ert causal effects on one another). This
makes the philosophical debate about free
will and determinism in a state of under-
determination by current neuroscientific
findings. Consequently, and referring to
the quotation that started this essay, we
might conclude by saying that: Neurosci-
ence may in no way interfere with our first-
person experience of the will, it can in the
end only describe it . . . it leaves everything
as it is.
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